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Abstract 
We present new comparable data on the incidence of performance pay schemes in Europe and the 
USA.  We  find  that  the  percentage  of  employees  exposed  to  incentive  pay  schemes  ranges  from 
around 10-15 percent in some European countries to over 40 percent in Scandinavian countries and 
the US. Individual pay and profit/gain sharing schemes are widely diffused, whereas share ownership 
schemes  are  much  less  common,  particularly  in  Europe.  We  document  a  number  of  empirical 
regularities. Incentive pay is less common in countries with a higher share of small firms. Higher 
product and labour market regulation are associated with lower use of incentive pay. Capital market 
development is a necessary requirement for a wider diffusion of incentive pay, particularly sharing 
and ownership schemes. When we control for a large set of individual characteristics and company 
attributes, we find that the probability that a worker is covered by an incentive scheme is higher in 
large firms and in high-skilled occupations, while it is much lower for females.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Analysts and policy makers often promote linking pay to employee or company performance 
as  a means  of tackling workplace inefficiencies and raising productivity.   By motivating 
individual  workers  to  be  more  efficient  at  work  and  increasing  their  attachment  and 
identification with the interests of the enterprise, incentive schemes are expected to improve 
interpersonal relationships, raise job satisfaction, lower absenteeism and lower turnover rates, 
all of which should produce lasting effects on company performance.  But does empirical 
evidence support these expectations and, if so, wouldn't we expect to seem similarities in the 
diffusion of incentive schemes among firms and employees in Europe and the US?  
This paper contributes to the literature by mapping the incidence of performance-
related  pay  schemes  across  the  US  and  Europe.    In  doing  so  we  point  to  a  number  of 
empirical regularities that suggest some potential explanations for cross-country differences 
in the prevalence of performance related pay.  
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents some general results on the 
incidence of different types of incentive pay schemes in Europe and in the US.  Section 3 
documents a number of regularities in the distribution of performance pay within countries, 
while Section 4 looks more specifically at differences across countries and suggests some 




2.  Forms of Incentive Pay and their Incidence 
 
The principle of relating pay to performance is as old as the practice of sharecropping, in 
which  a  farmer  who  works  someone  else’s  land  is  paid  with  a  share  of  the  harvest.  
Remunerating workers “by the piece” was said  by Adam Smith (1776) to be the rule in 
industry in the 18
th century
1.   Various types of performance bonus schemes, and plans in 
which firms shared profit with employees or encouraged them to own shares in the company 
existed at least since the 1840s in France, the UK and the US, as wel l as in Japan since the 
end of the first World War (Hatton, 1988; Jones and Kato, 1995).  In a separate development, 
the first trading organisations owned by workers appeared in the UK, France and Italy in the 
first half of the 19
th century (Cole, 1948; Desroche, 1976; Fornasari and Zamagni, 1997).  
Studies for the US in the 1980s-1990s reported that 5 to 10 percent of employees had 
some form of incentive pay, with wide differences by industry (ranging from 2 percent in the 
chemical industry, to 26 percent in the service sector) and occupation (from 2 percent in low 
skilled blue-collar occupation up to  21 percent in  sales occupations)  (see Carlson, 1982; 
Bonars and Moore, 1995; Barkume and Moehrle, 2001; MacLeod and Parent, 1999).  Studies 
for the US in the late 1990s-2000s report much higher figures for incentive pay, suggesting 
significant  growth  in  the  percentage  of  employees  covered  by  incentive  pay  schemes.  
Indeed, comparing data from 1994/95 to 2003/04 in a variety of US data sets Dube and 
Freeman (2010) conclude that indeed there was a huge increase in group incentive pay from 
the  1970s  through  the  1990s.    Lemieux,  McCleod  and  Parent  (2009),  using  PSID  data, 
estimated that 15 percent of workers received incentive pay in a given year while 37 percent 
held jobs in which a worker ‘ever’ received incentive pay, and 45 percent of workers were in 
one of the two groups.  In the PSID the share of employees in jobs with incentive pay ranged 
from  30  percent for craftsmen to  78 percent for sales workers; while shares  by  industry 
ranged from a low of 33 percent in mining and durables to a high of 65 percent in finance, 
                                                 
1 P. 185 (1979 edition). 2 
insurance, and real estate.  Lazear and Shaw (2009) report that close to 67 percent of firms 
used individual incentives for more than 20 percent of workers while 24 percent of firms had 
gain-sharing schemes for more than 20 percent of workers.  Evidence from the 2002 and 
2006 special modules of the General Social Survey (GSS) show that financial participation 
schemes  (i.e.  profit  sharing,  gain  sharing  or  employee  share  ownership)  cover  up  to  47 
percent of employees (Freeman, et al. 2010; Kruse, et al. 2010). 
Surveys of company pay practices in Europe (e.g. Cranet e-survey and EPOC) show 
widespread adoption of the schemes in the late 1990s, at least among larger firms (Pendleton, 
et  al.  2005).  Nearly one in two companies (45 percent) with more than 200 employees 
reported  having  some  form  of  sharing  scheme,  with  one-third  (31  percent)  having  an 
employee share ownership scheme.  However, comparable figures for employee coverage 
show lower incidences of 10-12 percent for sharing schemes and 2 percent for ownership 
schemes.    This  reflects  the  fact  that  in  some  firms  only  a  minority  of  workers  receive 
incentive pay while few firms with less than 200 employees are likely to have any scheme.  
Even in industries where a large proportion of companies have schemes, they usually account 
for  only  a  small  share  of  total  pay.    Evidence  from  selected  studies  and  EU  reports  on 
employees’ financial participation
2 shows that the overall incidence of group incentive pay in 
the private sector has been growing, but at 12 percent to 15 percent falls short of the levels in 
the US.  On average less than one-fifth of European employees have ever received some form 
of incentive pay. 
Researchers have investigated the patterns of incentive pay among firms, determinants 
of the type of compensation chosen by firms and the effects of the mode of compensation on 
performance in some European countries.
3 These studies show that mandatory provisions for 
incentive schemes (often above a given firm size level), or the introduction of strong fiscal 
incentives (such as reduced taxation for variable components of pay) are among the main 
determinants underlying the diffusion of incentive pay in a gi ven country, and help explain 
significant differences in the incidence in sharing and ownership schemes in European 
countries. 
Despite this evidence, it is difficult to make strong comparative statements about 
country differences because data from official   sources on the incidence and diffusion of 
incentive pay is relatively scarce.  In the US, until the General Social Survey asked about the 
structure of incentive pay schemes in special modules on ‘quality of work life’ (2002 GSS) 
and  ‘shared  capitalism’  (2002,  2006  GSS),  there  was  no  single  nationally  representative 
source of data available.  Similarly, in the EU, with the exception of the ad hoc Cranet, 
EPOC and European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) there are no official sources of 
representative data on incentive pay. 
To help deal with the data problem, we have examined evidence on incentive pay and 
financial participation in two household surveys – the EU's EWCS and the US's GSS.  The 
surveys  provide  detailed  information  on  individual  bonuses  and  piece-rates,  profit/gain 
sharing  and  share  ownership  schemes,  employees’  characteristics,  firm  attributes  and 
additional work organisation practices.  One drawback is that EWCS data do not provide 
separate information on work-group performance pay which is consistent over time (while 
GSS  does),  thus  in  the  empirical  analysis  that  follows  we  include  all  kinds  of  group-
performance bonuses with profit/gain sharing schemes.  We use the latest waves available, 
the 2000 and 2005 surveys for EWCS data, and the 2002 and 2006 surveys for the GSS.  
Since, data on new member countries of the European Union is available only in 2005, we 
                                                 
2  Brown  and  Heywood,  2002;  European  Commission,  IV  Pepper  report,  2009;  Poutsma,  2001;  European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007 
3 Blinder, 1990; Cahuc and Dormont, 1992; Meade, 1986; Estrin et al. 1997; Conyon and Freeman, 2001; Kato 
and Morishima, 2002; Barth et al. 2006, 2009; Pendleton et al. 2009 3 
focus on the EU15.
4 Detailed information on sampling procedure and the exact wording of 
the incentive pay questions are reported in Bryson   et al. (2012).   Moreover, in order  to 
minimise  potentially  confounding  factors,  we  restrict  attention  to  employees  with  a 
permanent contract, employed in private sector and in profit oriented firms only.  We also do 
not consider managers and CEOs, which are covered by Conyon et al. (2012 ).  
Figure 1 reports the ranking of countries by the share of  private sector employees on 
permanent contracts  who receive any form of incentive pay (i.e. individual, profit/gain 
sharing and share ownership schemes) .   It shows striking  differences in the diffusion of 
incentive pay across countries.
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Source:  EWCS (pooled 2000-2005) and GSS (pooled 2002-2006) data. 
Notes:  Indices are computed using sampling weights. 
 
Figures  range  from  around  10-15  percent  in  some  Mediterranean  (Portugal  and 
Greece),  Continental  (Belgium  and  Germany)  and  Anglo-Saxon  (United  Kingdom  and 
Ireland) countries, to 30 and over 40 percent in Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Finland) 
and  the  US.    Adjusting  for  some  observable  industry  and  firm  attributes  to  create  our 
standardised index)
6, does not change the ranking of countries.  
Figure 2 shows the diffusion of incentive pay over time across Europe (panel a) and 
the US (panel b) for private sector workers over the 2000-2006 period.  
                                                 
4 These countries are Portugal, Greece, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Italy, France, Sweden and Finland. 
5  Problems  of  comparability  due  to  measurement  error,  cross -country  differences  in  definitions  and 
measurement of incentive pay, differences in institutions, and government policies as well as long -term 
macroeconomic conditions are not large enough to gainsay the pattern in the figure. 
6 The standardised index is the mean incidence of incentive pay, conditional on industry and workplace size. 
Technically, it is derived as the estimated country fixed effects from a cross -country panel regression that 
includes workplace size and a full set of industry dummies as additional controls. 4 
Figure 2:  Individual performance related pay and financial participation in Europe 
and US  
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Source:  EWCS (2000-2005) and GSS (2002-2006) data. 
Note:  Figures are computed using sampling weights. 
 
Individual performance pay schemes have become more common, but it is likely this 
increase is due to use of discretionary merit pay rather than traditional piece rates.  Studies 
suggest traditional piece-rate payments are in decline (Freeman and Kleiner, 2005).  Group-
based profit sharing and gainsharing has also risen, whereas there has been little change in the 
incidence of share ownership.  
 
Table 1:  Country patterns in incentive schemes  
    Change in incidence (2000-2005)§ 
    High  Low 
Incidence 
(2000) §  High  AUS, SPA, ITA   FRA, SWE, FIN, US, 
GER 
       
  Low 
POR, GRE, BEL, IRE, 
LUX  DK, UK, NETHE  
       
Source:  EWCS and GSS data.  
Note:  § 2000-2005 EWCS; 2002-2006 GSS.  Computed using sampling weights 
 
Table 1 classifies countries according to their (average) diffusion of overall incentive 
pay  (i.e.  any  of  individual/piece-rate,  profit/gain  sharing  and  share  ownership)  at  the 
beginning of the period, and the change that occurred over the 2000-2005 period.  Austria, 
Italy  and  Spain  exhibit  both  a  high-incidence  and  a  significant  (positive)  change  in  the 
diffusion  of  incentive  schemes  over  the  period.    Most  other  high-incidence  European 
countries (FIN, FRA, SWE, GER) and the US are characterised by a fairly moderate increase 
in incentive pay schemes over the same period.  Conversely, countries with initially lower 
incidence and diffusion of incentive pay (BEL, GRE, IRE, LUX, POR) show a catching-up 
with respect to high-incidence countries.  Finally, there is a group of countries (DK, NETHE, 
UK), that show a lower than average incidence and moderate (positive) rate of change in 
incentive pay diffusion.  5 
Determining the relative importance of the different factors behind the incidence and 
growth of performance related pay is not straightforward, as implied by some of the literature 
on these issues (for a review see European Commission, 1991, 1997 and 2006), since several 
variables are hard to measure and a large number of potentially confounding effects are at 
work.  We discuss some of these in identifying empirical regularities about the incidence of 
incentive pay schemes within and across countries. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Regularities Within Countries  
 
In  this  section  we  report  some  empirical  regularities  that  characterise  the  diffusion  of 
incentive pay in Europe and in the US by occupation, industry and firm size.
7 
Figure 3 reports the distribution of  individual pay schemes, profit/gain sharing and 
share ownership schemes by selected occupations in Europe and the US.  In both Europe and 
US, the diffusion of profit/gain sharing schemes and share ownership is greater in high 
skilled than low-skilled occupations.  In Europe, individual schemes are concentrated among 
those in low-skilled occupations whereas in the US it is tho se in high-skilled jobs who are 
more likely to have individual schemes.  In Europe and the US the percentage of employees 
covered by financial participation schemes, whether share plans or profit-sharing, rises as one 
moves up the occupational hierarchy.  But within each occupation  financial participation is 
much more common in the US than in Europe. 
Turning to the distribution of incentive schemes by industry (Figure 4), our data show 
that they are more diffused in manufacturing and financial services, and  less prevalent in 
hotel and restaurant and in other services industries .  The main difference between Europe 
and the US lies in the relative importance of individual and piece -rates pay schemes relative 
to financial participation schemes.  
Finally, there are significant differences in the distribution of incentive pay schemes 
by firm size (Figure 5).  A priori, the relationship between incentive pay and firm size is not 
obvious.  On the one hand, monitoring costs of workers are likely to be higher in large firms, 
which may make it more profitable to adopt incentive modes of payment but, on the other 
hand, free riding behaviour should make the incentive effects weaker .   Empirically, the 
distribution of incentive schemes shows an almost monotonic increase with size of firm. 
                                                 
7 In comparing our figures with other studies we note that our sample only includes private sector employees 
with a permanent contract. Managers and CEO have been excluded from the present analysis since they are the 
exclusive focus of  Conyon et al. (2012) in the same volume. 6 
Figure  3:    Individual  incentive  schemes,  profit  sharing  and  share  ownership  by 
occupation, Europe and US 
a) Europe  
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b) US  










individual performance  profit gainsharing share ownership
 
Source:  EWCS (pooled 2000-2005) and GSS (pooled 2002-2006) data. 
Note:  CEO and Managers are excluded.  Sampling weights are used in the calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Individual incentive schemes, profit sharing and share ownership by 
industry, Europe and US 
a) Europe  
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b) US  









individual performance  profit gainsharing share ownership
 
Source:  EWCS (pooled 2000-2005) and GSS (pooled 2002-2006) data. 
Note:  Sampling weights are used in the calculations. 
 7 
Figure 5:  Individual incentive schemes, profit sharing and share ownership by firm 
size, Europe and US 
a) Europe  
 
b) US  






individual performance  profit gainsharing share ownership
 
Source:  EWCS (pooled 2000-2005) and GSS (pooled 2002-2006) data. 
Note:  firm size bands differ between EWCS and GSS data.  Sampling weights are used in the calculations. 
 
Table 2 compares the characteristics of workers in incentive pay jobs with those on 
fixed pay only.  Those receiving incentive pay are more likely to be males, more highly 
educated, and to have longer tenure.  Incentive pay is more common in larger firms, in high-
skilled occupations like professional, while it is less common in service jobs.  Differences are 
generally  more  pronounced  in  the  US,  where  pay  levels  are  much  higher  for  employees 
covered by (any) incentive pay scheme than for those who are not so covered.  Marginal 
effects of the probability that an employee receives some form of incentive pay based on 
separate  probit  regressions  for  Europe  and  the  US  produce  similar  results  to  Table  2 
confirming a lower probability of incentive schemes for women, young workers and the less 
educated.  The partial effects for firm size are substantial: employees in medium-sized and 
large firms are characterised by a much higher probability to be in incentive pay jobs, as 
compared to employees in small firms.  






















profit  gainsharing  share 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics:  Incentive schemes and fixed pay, Europe and US 
   Europe  US 
   Incentive pay  Fixed pay  Incentive pay  Fixed pay 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Personal characteristics         
female  0.310  0.461  0.436  0.542 
loweduc*  0.208  0.295  0.067  0.130 
mideduc*  0.403  0.395  0.644  0.711 
higheduc*  0.389  0.311  0.289  0.158 
age <25 years  0.141  0.187  0.134  0.179 
age 25-34 years  0.314  0.298  0.296  0.286 
age 35-44 years  0.278  0.262  0.253  0.215 
age 45+ years   0.267  0.253  0.316  0.321 
Industry and occupations          
professionals  0.083  0.068  0.216  0.133 
white  0.300  0.316  0.359  0.306 
service workers  0.128  0.175  0.105  0.193 
blue collars  0.490  0.441  0.320  0.368 
agriculture  0.021  0.020  0.015  0.017 
industry  0.642  0.548  0.513  0.568 
services  0.337  0.432  0.472  0.414 
Firm’s size         
very small (EU1-4/US1-9)  0.103  0.180  0.159  0.236 
small (EU5-9/US10-49)  0.130  0.190  0.229  0.263 
medium (EU10-49/US50-99)  0.376  0.361  0.157  0.135 
large (EU50-249/US100-499)  0.288  0.211  0.249  0.204 
very large (EU250+/US500+)  0.104  0.058  0.207  0.162 
Work attributes         
tenure  9.940  8.420  6.030  5.660 
hours worked  39.113  36.765  42.966  39.689 
Wages (EU-Euros/US-USD)  1,132.926  1,059.843  2,588.470  1,387.270 
Nobs  3,814  20,345  668  943 
Note: * the variable education for EWCS is only present in 2000.  
Sampling weights have been used to compute statistics. 
 
We  also  ran  probit  estimates  to  investigate  the  association  of  incentive  pay  with 
various indicators of “high involvement management” (HIM) practices (Table 3).   Using 
different specifications with random and fixed country effects we find that, ceteris paribus, 
HIM is positively associated with the probability that a worker receives incentive pay.  In 
particular, low job autonomy (-3 percent in EU; -14 percent in US) and performing repetitive 
tasks (-2 percent in EU; -12 percent in US) are associated with a lower probability that the 
worker is in a job covered by an incentive pay scheme.  This is consistent with the notion that 
in jobs where the pace of work is dictated by the technology, workers can be more easily 
monitored and are less likely to receive incentive pay.  Conversely, working in shifts and 
performing complex tasks are positively associated with the probability of a worker receiving 
incentive pay.  Long working hours defined by more than 40 hours per week show opposite 
effects in Europe and the US: in European countries long hours of work are associated with a 
higher probability of incentive pay (+5 percent), while in the US the probability is lower (-5 
percent).  One possible explanation for this is the greater hours worked in the US, which 
means the threshold of 40 hours a week has a different meaning than in Europe. 9 
Table 3:  Incentive pay and work organisation, Europe and US 
  Europe  US 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Repetitive work (=1)  -0.023***  -0.016**  -0.114***  -0.124*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Shift (=1)  0.027***  0.016*  0.030  0.028 
  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
High work intensity (=1)  0.040***  0.036***  -0.011  -0.011 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Low Job autonomy (=1)  -0.034***  -0.029***  -0.151***  -0.138*** 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.020) 
Complex tasks (=1)  0.025**  0.022***  -0.033  -0.027 
  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
Working hours>40  0.037***  0.044***  -0.050**  -0.047*** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
Country random effects#         
Country fixed effects#         
Rsquared  0.058  0.06  0.101  0.113 
Nobs  14,544  14,544  1,530  1,530 
Note: All estimates include also employee, firm characteristics and year dummies. 
Excluded  categories  are:  males,  primary  education,  <25  years,  professional, 
agriculture, firm size <5 EU/<10 US;  
# For Europe we include country dummies, for US four macro regional dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significance levels: *** if p<0.01, ** if 
p<0.05, * if p<0.1 .  Probit partial effects reported. 
 
If we consider correlates of individual incentive schemes and financial participation 
we find individual characteristics are more strongly correlated with financial participation 
than  with  individual  schemes  (Table  4).    In  Europe,  high  education  is  not  statistically 
associated with having individual incentive pay, while the blue collar dummy is positive and 
statistically significant – the opposite of the pattern in the US.  The likely reason is that 
individual pay schemes for employees in Europe are more often old style piece-rates rather 
than merit pay based on objective and subjective assessments of performance.  In Europe, 
firm size monotonically increases the probability of incentive pay with similar magnitudes for 
both  individual  and  financial  participation  schemes  whereas,  in  the  US,  there  is  no 
statistically significant effect of firm size for individual schemes and much larger effects on 
financial participation than in Europe. 10 
Table 4:  Types of incentive schemes, Europe and US 










Employee Characteristics         
Female (=1)  -0.044***  -0.049***  -0.128***  -0.112*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.026)  (0.030) 
Mideduc (=1)  0.008  0.022**  0.029  0.119*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.040)  (0.045) 
Higheduc (=1)  0.005  0.052***  0.171***  0.257*** 
  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.056)  (0.052) 
age 25-34 years (=1)  0.008  0.034***  -0.006  0.063 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.037)  (0.043) 
age 35-44 years (=1)  0.013*  0.034***  0.038  0.143*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.039)  (0.044) 
age 45+ years (=1)  0.001  0.024***  -0.031  0.091** 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.035)  (0.042) 
White collars (=1)  0.006  -0.001  -0.013  -0.026 
  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.037)  (0.045) 
Service workers (=1)  0.017  -0.020***  -0.096***  -0.181*** 
  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.040)  (0.050) 
Blue collars (=1)  0.034***  -0.056***  -0.150***  -0.136** 
  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.038)  (0.049) 
Firm Characteristics         
Industry (=1)  0.013  0.012  -0.016  -0.064 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.093)  (0.112) 
Service (=1)  -0.009  -0.004  0.034  -0.054 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.094)  (0.113) 
small (EU5-9; US10-49) (=1)  0.014*  0.009  -0.011  0.114*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.035)  (0.040) 
medium (EU10-49; US50-99) (=1)  0.027***  0.024***  0.041  0.217*** 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
large (EU50-249; US100-499) (=1)  0.047***  0.056***  0.015  0.241*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.036)  (0.039) 
very large (EU250+; US500+) (=1)  0.074***  0.089***  0.012  0.291*** 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
R-squared  0.079  0.104  0.077  0.106 
Number of obs  14,583  14,583  1,530  1,530 
 
There are also significant differences between Europe and the US in terms of the 
number of incentive schemes employees are subject to.  Only a very small proportion of 
European workers (1.4 percent) is covered by two schemes, while over one quarter (25.2 
percent)  of  US  workers  is  in  a  job  that  combine  individual  and  financial  participation 
schemes.  The coefficients in Table 5 are from an ordered probit equation that estimates the 
partial effect for the probability of a worker being covered by more schemes -- i.e. we report 
both individual (or group) incentive pay and financial participation (other categories, not 
reported,  are  fixed  pay  or  individual  (or  group)  incentive  pay  only).    Women,  the  less 
educated, young persons and workers in blue collar and service jobs are less likely to be 
subject to multiple incentive schemes than workers with the opposite characteristics.  Size of 
firm  also  increases  the  chance of  having  both  a financial participation and an individual 
incentive system. 
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Table 5:  Number of incentive schemes:  Distribution and estimates (ordered probit), 
Europe and US 
   Europe  US 
Number of incentive 
schemes  0  84.21  49.72 
  1  14.38  25.08 
  2  1.41  25.2 
Employee Characteristics     
Female (=1)  -0.068***  -0.113*** 
  (0.004)  (0.025) 
Mideduc (=1)  0.019**  0.111*** 
  (0.008)  (0.038) 
Higheduc (=1)  0.040***  0.248*** 
  (0.010)  (0.043) 
Age 25-34 years (=1)  0.028***  0.048 
  (0.007)  (0.036) 
Age 35-44 years (=1)  0.032***  0.118*** 
  (0.007)  (0.035) 
Age 45+ years (=1)  0.018**  0.083** 
  (0.007)  (0.035) 
White collars (=1)  -0.001  -0.015 
  (0.008)  (0.039) 
Service workers (=1)  -0.014  -0.159*** 
  (0.009)  (0.045) 
Blue collars (=1)  -0.023***  -0.124*** 
  (0.008)  (0.042) 
Firm Characteristics     
Industry (=1)  0.020  -0.083 
  (0.017)  (0.089) 
Service (=1)  -0.009  -0.058 
  (0.016)  (0.091) 
small (EU5-9; US10-49) (=1)  0.018**  0.067** 
  (0.008)  (0.034) 
medium (EU10-49; US50-99) (=1)  0.039***  0.172*** 
  (0.007)  (0.035) 
large (EU50-249; US100-499) (=1)  0.075***  0.181*** 
  (0.008)  (0.030) 
very large (EU250+; US500+) (=1)  0.105***  0.216*** 
  (0.011)  (0.031) 
R-squared  0.0814  0.112 
Nobs  14544  1530 
Note:  The dependent variable indicates the type of incentive pay schemes. It takes value 0 for fixed pay, 1 for 
individual or collective incentive pay and 2 for both individual, collective incentive pay and financial participation. 
All regressions include year dummies, and for Europe we include country effects, while for US macro regional 
dummies.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Ordered probit partial effects reported for top outcome=2. 
Significance levels:  *** if p<0.01, ** if p<0.05, * if p<0.1.  
 
To improve understanding of why there has been growth in the use of incentive pay 
we decompose the increase into changes associated with the characteristics of the workforce 
(i.e. more skilled workers, less service workers, increase in the proportion of large sized 
firms, etc.) versus changes in the probability of incentive schemes that are associated with 12 
those  characteristics.
8  We do the same exercise for the differences between coverage by 
incentive systems between Europe and the US.
9 Table 6 shows that in the US 38 percent of 
the growth is due to changes in the characteristics of workers and 62 percent to changes in the 
associated probabilities; whereas in Europe the trend is entirely attributable to changes in the 
probabilities - that is to say, it occurs within all worker types. 
 
Table 6: Decomposition of incentive schemes over time (2005 versus 2000§) 
   EU  US 
   coef  %  coef  % 
Characteristics  -0.002  -3.63  0.0177  37.92 
Coefficients  0.742  103.62  0.029  62.07 
Raw differential  0.0716  100  0.0467  100 
Note:  Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition for non linear estimation. 
§ for the US the time span is 2006 versus 2002. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the decomposition between the EU and the US.  Only 
fifteen percent of the difference in the incidence of incentive pay between the US and Europe 
is due to differences in the characteristics of US and European workers. 
 
Table 7:  Decomposition of incentive schemes, US versus EU 
  US vs EU 
  coef  % 
Characteristics  0.0513  14.96 
Coefficients  0.292  85.04 
Raw differential  0.342  100 
Note:  Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition for non linear estimation.  
Data are pooled over two surveys (2000-2005; 2002-2006). 
 
Even controlling for a relatively large set of individual and firm characteristics, cross 
country differences in the probability that a worker receives some form of incentive pay 
remain large.  We examine country differences next. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Regularities Between Countries 
 
Because we have relatively few countries in our data set, we examine the links between the 
diffusion  of  incentive  pay  schemes  and  country  variables  with  simple  two  variable 
comparisons  of  the  incidence  of  incentive  pay  (always  on  the  Y-axis)  with  measures  of 
specific country characteristics (always on the X-axis).  Patterns that replicate those found 
within countries are more likely to hold up under more detailed investigation. 
  The first empirical regularity is reported in Figure 6, where we correlate incentive pay 
(i.e.  share  of  employees  covered  by  an  incentive  scheme,  on  the  Y-axis)  and  the  size 
distribution of workplaces (on the X-axis).  Incentive pay is less common in countries where 
a higher proportion of workers are in firms with less than 50 employees (rho=  - 0.35)
10.  
                                                 
8 We perform a Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition of the mean outcome differential of our dependent variable 
(incentive pay) as developed by Bauer and Sinning (2008). We also use Neumark's (1988) weighting matrix. 
9 There are caveats for this exercise, namely the time period is not exactly the same in EU and the US; and there 
remain measurement differences between the EU and US surveys 
10 The correlation is partly driven by the position of the US. If we exclude the US the correlation is still negative 
but the fitted line slightly flattens. 13 
These tend to be Mediterranean countries where the share of family firm is larger, which is 
independently  likely  to  limit  the  introduction  and  diffusion  of  employee  financial 
participation schemes (Pendleton et al. 2005).  
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Source:  EWCS, GSS and OECD institutional data. 
Note:  country averages (2000-2005 EWCS; 2002-2006 GSS). 
 
Unions  generally  favour  modes  of  payment  that  limit  managerial  discretion  and 
underpin egalitarian pay.  Workers paid on piece-rates are, in general, less likely to be union 
members.  However, Figure 7a shows that the relationship between union density and the 
extent of incentive pay is “U”-shaped with a high incidence of incentive pay at both low and 
high levels of unionisation.  This could reflect the possibility that strong unions may be able 
to  negotiate  the  introduction  of  (collective)  incentive  pay  schemes  and  monitor  their 
application with direct participation in joint management committees.  Since union density 
may not accurately reflect effective union bargaining power Figure 7b shows the relationship 
between incentive schemes and excess bargaining power, that is the ability of the union to 
extend the effects of collective bargaining over and above their membership.
11 The negative 
correlation shows that incentive pay schemes are more diffused in institutional settings where 
unions are weak or where they are encom passing; conversely when bargaining power is 
based on (excess) coverage there is likely to be strong opposition to performance related and 
discretionary pay.  
                                                 
11 Excess bargaining power is computed as the difference between collective contracts coverage and union 
membership. In France, for example, union coverage is close to 95 percent while union membership is less than 
10 percent; conversely in Sweden both coverage and unionisation are very high and excess bargaining power is 
low. The extent of excess bargaining coverage depends on mandatory (or de facto) extensions of union contracts 
to the relevant occupation/industry. 14 
Figure 7:  Incentive pay, union density and excess bargaining power 
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Source:  EWCS, GSS and OECD institutional data. 
Note:  country averages (2000-2005 EWCS; 2002-2006 GSS). 
 
Figure 8a displays the relationship between a measure of the regulation of product 
markets and the diffusion of incentive pay.  Figure 8b shows the relation between a measure 
of the regulation of labour markets and the diffusion of incentive pay.  Both measures of 
regulation are negatively correlated with the diffusion of incentive pay  (rhoPM = - 0.384; 
rhoLM = - 0.434).  Countries with highly regulated product and labour markets -- such as 
Mediterranean and (some) Continental European countries  –  exhibit  a lower diffusion of 
incentive  pay.    Perhaps  greater  regulation  reduces  competitive  pressures  to  introduce 
performance related pay to attract, retain and motivate high ability employees? 
Capital market development is also associated with the diffusion of incentive pay.  
Sharing and ownership schemes are more likely when a larger proportion of companies are 
listed on the stock exchange or capital markets are otherwise more developed.  Figure 9 
shows  a  strong  positive  correlation  (rho=  0.51)  between  an  index  of  capital  market 
development
12 and the diffusion of incentive pay .  Nevertheless, there is a high degree of 
variance in the incidence of sharing schemes in countries scoring highly on capital market 
development (Festing et al. 1999, Pendleton et al. 2001; Poutsma, 2001). 
                                                 
12 We use the World Bank Capital market index. 
rho=-0.34 15 
Figure 8:  Incentive pay and market regulation 
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Source:  EWCS, GSS and OECD institutional data. 
Note: country averages (2000-2005 EWCS; 2002-2006 GSS). 
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Source:  EWCS, GSS and World Bank Capital market index. 
Note:  country averages (2000-2005 EWCS; 2002-2006 GSS). 
 
Output variability is often treated as an indicator of high demand for flexibility by 
firms.  Flexibility over the wage bill can come through incentive pay.  However, Figure 10 
does not support this hypothesis, as the correlation is weak and bears the opposite sign (rho = 
- 0.113). 
Finally, “high involvement management” practices are likely to be associated with 
incentive  pay  as  discussed  earlier.    In  Figure  11  we  relate  an  index  of  several  high 
involvement management practices to the incidence of incentive pay.
13 The figure documents 
a large spread in management practices across countries and a positive relationship with the 
diffusion of incentive pay (rho = 0.219). 
 
                                                 
13 To construct our indicator of HIMP, we use principal component analysis to extract the first factor out of a 
large number of management practices drawn from EWCS data. 16 
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Overall, the empirical  regularities suggest the existence of an association between 
country attributes and the diffusion of incentive pay schemes.  
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5.  Conclusion 
 
Only a limited number of studies have investigated the diffusion of incentive schemes across 
different countries.  We contribute to this literature by presenting new comparable data on the 
incidence and growth of incentive schemes in Europe and the USA.  The share of workers who 
receive any form of incentive pay (i.e. individual, profit/gain sharing and share ownership) is 
strikingly  different  between  countries,  ranging  from  10-15  percent  in  some  European 
countries to over 40 percent in Scandinavian countries and the US.  Individual pay schemes 
and financial participation appear to be on the rise across Europe, although their incidence 
remains much lower than in the US.  There is some evidence of a catching-up for those 
countries with incidence below the median. 
There are within-country and cross-country patterns in the diffusion in incentive pay 
that suggest that economic and institutional factors substantially affect the decision of firms 
and workers to choose this form of compensation and the type of incentive pay.  When we 
look across countries we find incentive pay is less common in countries with a higher share of 
small workplaces.  Higher product and labour market regulation are associated with lower use of 
incentive pay.  Capital market development is a necessary requirement for a wider diffusion of 
incentive pay, particularly sharing and ownership schemes.  Within countries, when we control 
for a large set of individual characteristics and company attributes, we find that the probability 
that a worker is covered by an incentive scheme is higher in large firms and in high-skilled 
occupations,  while  it  is  much  lower  for  females.    A  decomposition  of  the  differences  in 
incidence between periods and across Europe and the US, shows an important contribution of 
coefficients,  suggesting  the  existence  of  significant  differences  in  the  mechanisms  that 
determine  pay  and  incentive  schemes  both  within  and  across  firms,  rather  than  in  the 
distribution of characteristics of employees and workplaces. 18 
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